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A B S T R A C T   
Freeway on-ramp merging areas are high-risk areas for motor vehicle crashes and conflicts due to the variety of 
driving styles, the difference in mainline and ramp traffic states, and factors related to roadway design and traffic 
control. The emerging Autonomous Vehicle (AV) technologies are expected to bring substantial improvements in 
ramp merging operations in general, including the possibility to reduce traffic conflicts and crashes by partially 
or fully eliminating the critical factors related to the human drivers. In order to investigate the potential safety 
impacts of AVs at on-ramp merging, this study first proposes a novel conflict index in theory as a specific in-
dicator for ramp merging safety. Then, a merging conflict model is introduced to estimate the index value in 
various cases by considering the interactions between the mainline and ramp vehicles. In order to account for 
real-world uncertainties and variations in various crash-contributing factors, the proposed approach incorporates 
Monte-Carlo method and probabilistic distributions calibrated on the empirical freeway data. The developed 
approach is later applied in a case study with incremental AV market penetration rates to investigate AV safety 
impacts at on-ramp merging. The results show clear benefits of AVs in reducing the frequency and severity of the 
critical merging events. In addition, a sensitivity analysis on essential model parameters shows that the merging 
safety of AVs is closely related to their gap acceptance policy and the proper functioning of the driving systems, 
providing further insights into the future development of AVs.   
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background and objectives 
Freeway on-ramp merging areas are typical bottlenecks of the 
freeway network, not only because of the reduced capacity, but also 
because of the high risk of crashes and conflicts caused by frequent lane- 
changing, intricate geometric design, and the variety in driving behav-
iors in these areas. According to NHTSA, drivers are identified as the 
critical reason in 94 % of the reported road crashes (Singh, 2015). The 
main driver-related causes include errors in the recognition, 
decision-making, and performance process. Due to the complex vehicle 
negotiations and interactions at merging, drivers must complete multi-
dimensional information processing and vehicle control tasks within a 
limited distance and time, which greatly increases drivers’ workload and 
the probability of errors (Hu et al., 2020). 
The emerging technology of Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) has the 
potential to eliminate the critical human factors in driving, and thus is 
highly expected to bring substantial improvements in traffic operational 
safety. Many studies have been conducted to assess the safety impacts of 
AVs in various situations, such as the (signalized or unsignalized) in-
tersections (Li et al., 2013; Morando et al., 2018), roundabouts (Mor-
ando et al., 2018), freeway corridors (Jeong et al., 2017; Papadoulis 
et al., 2019), and at the traffic network level (Kockelman et al., 2016). 
All these studies report a remarkable reduction in the number of traffic 
conflicts with the presence of AVs, especially at a high AV market 
penetration rate. The findings are in line with the expectation of AV’s 
positive role in traffic safety. However, although AVs’ safety perfor-
mance in various types of traffic bottlenecks have been well discussed in 
the literature, there are only very few studies focusing on AVs’ driving 
behaviors and the resulted safety consequences in the freeway on-ramp 
merging bottlenecks. 
The existing studies on the AV’s impacts in the freeway on-ramp 
merging areas focus more on the operational efficiency rather than 
safety. For example, Park and Smith (2012) propose a merging advisory 
algorithm utilizing detailed vehicular data and personalized information 
provision. The authors claim that the algorithm reduces merging con-
flicts by encouraging early lane-changes on the mainline to create more 
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space for the merging vehicles. However, the paper only reports quan-
titative changes in vehicle hours traveled and average speed, while the 
specific number of conflicts reduced by the algorithm is not mentioned. 
Wang et al. (2013) propose a cooperative algorithm for the collision-free 
merging of connected vehicles, which ensures merging safety by map-
ping the mainline and ramp vehicles to each other’s lane as virtual ve-
hicles and limiting the minimum gap between the actual and mapped 
vehicles. Some other studies on freeway on-ramp merging algorithms 
integrate safety requirements into the joint trajectory planning of the 
mainline and ramp vehicles to ensure traffic safety (Letter and Elefter-
iadou, 2017; Rios-Torres and Malikopoulos, 2017). However, these 
studies usually aim at promoting the efficiency of merging, while the 
safety requirements are only indirectly considered as a constraint in the 
models. In addition, all above-reviewed studies propose novel cooper-
ative merging algorithms based on the advanced vehicle communication 
technology. In this way, the improvement in merging safety is more 
related to the enhanced vehicle cooperation (e.g. early mainline 
lane-changes, cooperative deceleration, joint planning of vehicle tra-
jectories) rather than the elimination of critical human factors (e.g. 
delays, errors, aggressiveness of human drivers). Therefore, the safety 
effects related to the AVs’ autonomous driving capability (i.e. by 
replacing human control with autonomous control and eliminating 
critical human factors at merging) are still largely unrevealed in the 
literature. 
In this regard, the objective of this study is to assess the safety im-
pacts of AVs in the freeway on-ramp merging areas with a focus on the 
special features of autonomous vehicle control compared to human 
control. Specifically, the following questions are investigated: (1) How 
(positive/negative) and to what extent will (uncoordinated) AVs affect 
the safety performance of traffic at freeway on-ramp merging by elim-
inating the critical human factors in the process of recognition, decision- 
making, and performance? (2) Despite the elimination of critical human 
factors, will autonomous driving lead to new safety concerns at 
merging? 
1.2. Key points of methodology 
Given the limited access to the real-world data on AVs, the safety 
impacts of AVs are usually investigated by combining surrogate safety 
measure and microscopic simulation (Shahdah et al., 2015; Kockelman 
et al., 2016; Morando et al., 2018; Papadoulis et al., 2019; Zhu and 
Krause, 2019). Studies have shown that, with suitable settings of 
simulation environment and indicator thresholds, the combination of 
simulation and safety surrogates can predict a number of conflicts which 
reliably reflect traffic operational safety (Fan et al., 2013; Shahdah et al., 
2015). There are various surrogate safety measures proposed in the 
literature, such as Time-to-Collision (TTC), Post-Encroachment Time 
(PET), velocity change, and deceleration rate. Previous studies have 
shown the adequate performance of the existing surrogate safety mea-
sures in describing various types of traffic conflicts (Minderhoud and 
Bovy, 2001; Jin et al., 2011; Kockelman et al., 2016; Morando et al., 
2018; Papadoulis et al., 2019). However, the abilities of the existing 
measures to capture the merging conflicts between a Ramp Merging 
Vehicle (RMV) and its Mainline Following Vehicle (MFV) is somewhat 
limited. Note that, as the initial parts of the trajectories of the RMV and 
the MFV are separate, and the final parts of their trajectories overlap, 
both longitudinal conflicts and lateral conflicts are present in the 
on-ramp merging areas. The longitudinal conflicts refer to the rear-end 
conflicts caused by the speed difference between the MFV and the RMV 
after they are merged into the same lane. This type of conflict is essen-
tially the same as the normal car-following rear-ends, which can be well 
assessed by TTC and its variations such as TIT and TET (Jin et al., 2011; 
Shahdah et al., 2015). The lateral conflicts refer to the conflicts that 
occur during the merging maneuver (i.e. the lateral movement) of the 
RMV. The cause of this type of conflicts is very similar to the cause of 
intersection conflicts, that is, vehicles initially occupying different 
roadway spaces enter a common area in their trajectories at very similar 
time. TTC is unable to recognize this type of lateral conflicts, because it 
only applies in the cases where the following vehicle is faster than the 
preceding one, which is not always true at merging. Moreover, the 
existing surrogate measures for intersection conflicts, such as PET, ET 
(encroachment time), and GT (gap time), cannot be directly applied to 
lateral merging conflicts as well, because these measures usually require 
an explicit definition of the start and end of the encroachment, which is 
not applicable for the merging situations, where the final trajectories of 
the conflicting traffic overlap (Archer, 2005). As a result of the limita-
tions of the existing surrogate safety measures in assessing lateral 
merging risk, we are motivated to modify the concept of PET and pro-
pose a new conflict index which are more applicable for the merging 
situations. 
In addition, it should be noted that there are many uncertainties in 
the traffic conditions (e.g. the varying vehicle speed, the existence of 
mainline gaps) and variations in the road users and the roadway design 
(e.g. the personality, experience, and condition of a human driver, the 
geometric configuration of the merging area). These uncertainties and 
variations should not be disregarded in the safety investigation, because 
the introduction of uncertainties and variations can reduce the bias 
produced by any specific cases and provide a more comprehensive 
insight into traffic safety (Althoff et al., 2010; Yang and Ozbay, 2011; 
Kuang et al., 2015). 
In this paper, we first introduce the new conflict index, called Con-
flicting Merging Headway (CMH), as a specific indicator for the critical 
merging events (i.e. near-crashes and conflicts). We also present a 
merging conflict model that describes the interactions between the RMV 
and the MFV to estimate the value of CMH in various cases. Then, we 
conduct a case study of AV safety impact analysis for a typical freeway 
on-ramp merging area. The safety investigation accounts for real-world 
uncertainties and variations in various factors by running Monte-Carlo 
simulation on the merging conflict model with probabilistic distribu-
tions as the model inputs. Scenarios with different AV market penetra-
tion rates are modeled and compared to a base scenario of Normal 
human-driven Vehicles (NVs). The input distributions for NVs are cali-
brated using the data collected under the Next Generation Simulation 
(NGSIM) program, and the distributions for AVs are derived from the 
expected capabilities and operating methods of AVs as reported in the 
published literature and technical reports. The Monte-Carlo simulation 
study outputs distributions of the CMH index under various AV pene-
tration rates. Statistical analysis on the CMH distributions gives an 
insight into the potential safety impacts of AVs in the freeway on-ramp 
merging areas. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the conflict 
index CMH and introduces the merging conflict model in detail. The 
calibration of input distributions and the implementation of Monte- 
Carlo simulations are presented in Section 3. Section 4 shows the re-
sults of the simulation study and provides a comprehensive discussion 
on the potential safety impacts of AVs. Section 5 discusses the limita-
tions of the current work and provides a guideline for the future 
research. The conclusion is drawn in the last section. 
Table 1 provides a summary of abbreviations that are frequently used 
in this paper. 
2. Freeway merging conflict model 
In this section, a merging conflict model describing vehicle decisions 
and actions in the on-ramp merging areas is presented. The model es-
timates the value of CMH index between each pair of RMV and MFV 
based on their interactive behaviors at merging. Since the ramp merging 
process includes a series of decisions and actions, this process is modeled 
in a sequence of three consecutive event processes: 1) the RMV gap se-
lection process, which describes how the RMV identifies a mainline gap 
as the target gap to merge into; 2) the RMV merging maneuver process, 
which determines the specific position of the RMV within the selected 
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target gap; and 3) the MFV evasive action process, which describes the 
evasive action of the MFV in response to an aggressive merging attempt. 
2.1. Conflicting merging headway 
The conflict index CMH is defined as the time interval between a 
ramp merging vehicle (i.e. the RMV) arriving at the Merging Point (MP) 
and the mainline vehicle that directly follows this RMV after merging (i. 
e. the MFV) arriving at the same position, as shown in Fig. 1. 
Note that even though CMH is defined as a measure of time headway, 
it is essentially different from the car-following headway that describes 
the relationship between vehicles in the same lane, such as the widely 
known TTC and its variations. CMH is measured at the initial state of 
merging, when the RMV and the MFV are still in different lanes. Thus, 
the value of CMH reflects the potential of the vehicles conflicting with 
each other in the subsequent merging process. Specifically, the smaller 
the CMH value is, the closer the initial longitudinal positions of the RMV 
and the MFV are, and the more likely they will conflict as the RMV 
moves laterally. In fact, CMH is, by definition, a variant of the widely 
used surrogate measure PET, as it adopts PET’s inherent idea of 
assessing the conflict risk based on the time that the vehicles occupy a 
common area where the conflict may occur. The difference between 
CMH and PET is that, PET describes the time interval between two ve-
hicles occupying a common spatial zone and is primarily designed for 
places with a clear end of the encroachment (e.g. intersections), while 
CMH describes the time interval between vehicles passing the merging 
point, from which the potential of conflict arises. With CMH, a clear 
determination of the end of the encroachment is not required, and thus it 
is more applicable for the merging situations, where the (final) trajec-
tories of the conflicting vehicles overlap. Nevertheless, CMH retains the 
underlying idea of PET in its definition. Please note that, in this paper, 
the efficiency of the CMH index is demonstrated from a theoretical 
perspective, with real-data supported estimation method. A more 
detailed validation on this index is expected in the future research ef-
forts. A detailed discussion on this point is available in Section 5. 
2.2. RMV gap selection process 
As the first step of the merging conflict model, the RMV gap selection 
process determines which mainline gap an RMV will merge into. Fig. 2 
shows a hypothetical merge segment with one lane per direction. When 
the RMV arrives at the Decision Point (DP) on the ramp, it looks at gaps 
on the mainline and accepts the first gap that satisfies both of the 
following conditions: 1) the RMV should have enough time to merge into 
the gap, meaning that the time the target gap passes the Merging Point 
(MP) should be no earlier than the earliest time that the RMV can arrive 
at the MP; 2) the gap should be big enough, which means that the size of 
the target gap should be no smaller than the acceptable gap of the RMV. 
These two conditions are expressed as 
ttarget> tearliest (1) 
and 
gtarget > gacc (2)  
where, ttarget is the time that the MFV arrives at MP (i.e. the target gap 
passes MP), tearliest is the earliest time that the RMV can arrive at MP, 
gtarget is the size of the target gap in second, and gacc is the acceptable gap 
of the RMV in second (i.e. the minimal time gap in the mainline traffic 
stream that the RMV can accept to merge into). 
As depicted in Fig. 2, ttarget can be formulated as the sum of all gaps in 
front of the target gap, including the target gap itself, namely 




The value of tearliest depends on the distance that the RMV cruises on 
the ramp and its speed trajectory. It is the shortest time the RMV can 
spend travelling from the DP to the MP, namely first accelerating at the 
maximum acceleration until the speed limit is reached, then keeping the 








where, Srcd is the ramp cruising distance of the RMV (i.e. the distance 
between the DP and the MP); amax is the maximum acceleration of the 
RMV, vr is the speed of the RMV at DP, vlimit – is the on-ramp speed limit. 
A step-by-step procedure of the RMV gap selection process is given in 
Fig. 3. 
2.3. RMV merging maneuver process 
Once the RMV has selected its target gap on the main road and 
decided to merge, the RMV’s exact position in the target gap and the 
initial headway between the RMV and the MFV should be determined in 
this process. This is decided by comparing two factors: the desired po-
sition of the RMV and the earliest-achievable position of the RMV. 
As shown in Fig. 4a, it is assumed that the RMV prefers to keep a 
distance of 12gacc from the Mainline Leading Vehicle (MLV) when no other 
restriction applies, as it is reasonable to expect that the driver of the 
RMV will prefer to be equally apart from its leading and following 
Table 1 
Abbreviations.  
AV (Autonomous Vehicle) Vehicle driving autonomously (SAE (2016) L4 
automation) 
NV (Normal human-driven 
Vehicle) 
Vehicle driven by human-drivers 
RMV (Ramp Merging 
Vehicle) 
Vehicle entering the main road from the on-ramp 
MFV (Mainline Following 
Vehicle) 
Mainline vehicle directly following an RMV after 
merging 
MLV (Mainline Leading 
Vehicle) 
Mainline vehicle directly leading an RMV after 
merging 
DP (Decision Point) Position at which the RMV searches for its target gap 
MP (Merging Point) Position at which the RMV enters the main road 
CMH (Conflicting Merging 
Headway) 
A conflict index, referring to the time interval between 
an RMV arriving at the merging point and the MFV that 
directly follows this RMV arriving at the same position  
Fig. 1. Definition of conflicting merging headway (CMH).  
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The earliest-achievable position is the foremost position that the 
RMV can reach, namely the position when the RMV arrives at its earliest 
arrival time (tearliest). 
Fig. 4b and c show the two cases when comparing the desired 
position to the earliest-achievable position. The RMV will take the 
desired position if it is later than the earliest-achievable position 
(Fig. 4b). Otherwise, the RMV will either take the earliest-achievable 
position (Fig. 4c) or change its target gap. Whether the target gap is 
changed depends on two factors: 1) whether the initial headway be-
tween the MFV and the earliest-achievable position of RMV is too critical 
(i.e. there is a need to change); 2) whether another gap is available 
within a reasonable distance (i.e. there is a possibility to change). In this 
model we assume that, the RMV will only give up the current gap if the 
initial headway h0 is smaller than a critical headway hc and an 
Fig. 2. Freeway on-ramp merging.  
Fig. 3. Gap selection process of the ramp merging vehicle.  
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alternative gap is available. 
After determining the RMV’s target gap and its actual position within 
the gap (tactual), the initial headway between the RMV and the MFV is 
expressed as 









gacc, when tactual = tdesire
ttarget − tearliest, when tactual = tearliest
(7)  
where, h0 is the initial headway between the RMV and the MFV, tearliest is 
the earliest arrival time of the RMV, tdesire is the desired position of the 
RMV, tactual is the actual position of the RMV in the target gap. The rest of 
Fig. 4. The desired position and the earliest-achievable position of the ramp merging vehicle (RMV) within the target gap.  
Fig. 5. Merging maneuver process of the ramp merging vehicle.  
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the parameters are defined the same as previously. 
Note that the initial headway h0 obtained in this step differs from the 
final value of the CMH which results after the evasive braking action of 
the MFV, as will be explained in the next step of the model. Fig. 5 is an 
overview of the RMV merging maneuver process. 
2.4. MFV evasive action process 
The MFV evasive action refers to the behavior that the MFV brakes to 
maintain a desired/safe distance from the RMV when the initial head-
way is too small, resulting in the final CMH as the expected conflict 
index for the merging process. In this process, a total of four merging 
situations are distinguished according to the evasive action of the MFV. 
The evasive braking rate (b) and the resulted final CMH are estimated for 
each situation. 
First, it is assumed that each MFV has a desired headway hd. The 
value of hd depends on driver aggressiveness (for NVs) or driving mode 
(for AVs). If hd is smaller than the initial headway h0, the initial headway 
is acceptable, and no evasive action is needed, namely 
Situation 1 : If h0 ≥ hd, then b = 0 AND CMH = h0 
Otherwise, the MFV should brake for safety reasons. We consider 
that the MFV can only be aware of the merging intention of the RMV a 
certain time before arriving at MP. If the reaction time of the MFV (τ) is 
longer than this awareness time (taware), the MFV does not have time to 
react and is forced to accept the initial headway h0, namely: 
Situation 2 : If h0 < hd AND τ ≥ taware, then b = 0 AND CMH = h0 
In the case where h0 < hd and τ < taware, the MFV will react by 
braking at a certain deceleration rate and achieve a final headway (i.e. 
the CMH) which is larger than the initial headway. 
Fig. 6a depicts the determination of the braking rate that is required 
to achieve the desired headway hd. The origin of the time axis is the time 
when the MFV becomes aware of the RMV. Thus, the MFV will arrive at 
MP in a time of taware without deceleration (black solid line in Fig. 6a). As 
the initial headway between the RMV and the MFV is h0, the arrival time 
of the RMV is taware − h0. If the MFV intends to keep a headway of hd 
from the RMV, its arrival time should be taware − h0 + hd. To achieve this 
desired arrival time, it is assumed that the MFV will first retain the initial 
speed vm within the reaction time τ and then brake at the deceleration b0 
(red solid line in Fig. 6a). Note that the distance the MFV travels before 
arriving at MP remains the same, namely the area enclosed by the black 
line and the axes should equal the area enclosed by the red line and the 
axes. Therefore, the value of b0 is computed by jointly solving (8) and (9) 
Fig. 6. Evasive braking rate of the mainline following vehicle.  
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(Eq. (8) describes the constancy of travel distance, and Eq. (9) describes 
the change in speed): 
vm∙taware = vm∙τ +




v’m = vm − b0∙(taware − h0 + hd − τ) (9)  
where, vm is the initial speed of the MFV, v’m is the reduced speed of the 
MFV when arriving at MP, taware is the awareness time of the MFV (i.e. 
the time from the MFV’s awareness of the merging intention of the RMV 
to the arrival of the MFV at MP), τ is the reaction time of the MFV, h0 is 
the initial headway between the RMV and the MFV, hd is the desired 
headway of the MFV, and b0 is the required braking rate of the MFV to 
maintain a desired headway of hd. 
We obtain the value of b0 to achieve the desired headway as: 
b0 =
2vm
taware − h0 + hd − τ
∙(1 − taware − τ
taware − h0 + hd − τ
) (10) 
If this required braking rate b0 is no greater than the maximum 
technically allowable deceleration (bmax), the MFV can brake at b0 and 
achieve a CMH equal to hd, namely 
Situation 3 : If h0 < hd AND τ < taware AND b0 ≤ bmax, then b
= b0 AND CMH = hd 
Fig. 6b depicts the situation when b0 is larger than bmax. In this case 
where b0 is not available, the MFV brakes at bmax and accepts a CMH 
between h0 and hd in size. To estimate the value of CMH for this case, the 
actual arrival time of the MFV (tarrival) should be determined (the red 
point in Fig. 6b). Similar to previously, this is done by jointly solving the 
Eqs. (11) and (12) which describe the MFV’s travel distance and change 
in speed, respectively: 
vm∙taware = vm∙τ +









vm2 − 2bmax∙vm∙(taware − τ)
√
bmax
+ τ (13) 




vm2 − 2bmax∙vm∙(taware − τ)
√
bmax
+ τ − (taware − h0) (14)  
Here, we have the case where the MFV achieves its maximum braking 
rate, and the resulted CMH is larger than the initial but smaller than the 
desired distance between the RMV and MFV: 
Situation 4:
If h0<hd ANDτ<taware AND b0>bmax, then b=bmax AND CMH by(14)
Fig. 7 illustrates the event tree of the MFV evasive action process 
with the final situations highlighted in red. 
3. Simulation study 
3.1. Monte-Carlo method 
The merging conflict model introduced in the previous section de-
scribes the deterministic relationship between a certain pair of RMV and 
MFV and estimates the value of the proposed conflict index, the CMH, 
which can readily be used as an indicator of how close the two vehicles 
in the merging process were to a conflict or a crash. 
In order to more closely represent real-world traffic conditions, 
which may help to achieve more accurate safety assessment, we need to 
acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and variations in the 
traffic conditions, the road user behaviors, and the roadway design. 
Thus, the parameter values of the merging conflict model are more likely 
to vary within a certain range than to be deterministic. A way to 
accommodate these uncertainties and variations is to use probabilistic 
distributions (instead of deterministic values) as inputs of the merging 
conflict model and conduct simulation study through the Monte-Carlo 
method. Specifically, in each simulation run, we randomly draw a 
value from the input distribution of each parameter (Table 2) and use 
these values to perform a deterministic computation of the CMH value 
Fig. 7. Evasive action process of the mainline following vehicle.  
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based on the equations derived in the merging conflict model. After 
repeating this simulation process for a large-enough number of times, 
we aggregate the outputs and obtain a distribution of CMH that is 
considered to be subject to various uncertainties and variations. 
Through the CMH distribution, we can assess the risk of merging and 
infer the probabilities of particular critical merging events, such as 
conflicts and near-crashes. 
The Monte-Carlo simulation is performed by using the software 
MATLAB, version R2020a. For each study scenario, 50,000 simulation 
runs are conducted to ensure a satisfying reliability level of the results. 
In addition to CMH, the values of evasive braking rate are also obtained 
from the simulation and used to derive conclusions about the conflict 
severity. 
3.2. Study scenarios 
Given that the main purpose of this study is to examine the ramp 
merging safety with the presence of AVs, four simulation scenarios with 
incremental market penetration rates of AVs are developed and 
compared to a base scenario with only manually-driven NV. 
The five study scenarios are:  
• 100 % NV scenario (NV100)  
• 20 % AV and 80 % NV mix-scenario (AV20)  
• 50 % AV and 50 % NV mix-scenario (AV50)  
• 80 % AV and 20 % NV mix-scenario (AV80)  
• 100 % AV scenario (AV100) 
In the mix-scenarios (AV20, AV50, and AV80), vehicles are randomly 
assigned as NV or AV based on the corresponding AV penetration rate. 
For example, in the AV20 scenario, a random number between 0 and 1 is 
drawn at each vehicle creation, if the number is smaller than 0.2, the 
newly-created vehicle is assigned as AV, otherwise it is tagged as NV. 
This procedure is repeated for each vehicle in the mix-scenarios. 
The following assumptions on AVs are adopted based on existing 
practice and research findings:  
• All AVs are at the highly automated level corresponding to SAE 
automation level 4 (SAE, 2016). The vehicles are capable of longi-
tudinal and lateral driving tasks without any expectations of human 
assistance. Communication capabilities of AVs are only partially 
considered in the sense that AVs possess more comprehensive in-
formation on the traffic conditions.  
• AVs have various driving modes (i.e. a configuration of parameters 
that decide the aggressiveness of AV driving behaviors) to accom-
modate various preferences of AV users. Three driving modes (an 
aggressive mode, a normal mode, and a conservative mode) and a 30 
%–40 % - 30 % share across the modes are assumed. 
3.3. A case study 
To demonstrate the proposed method of AV safety investigation at 
freeway on-ramp merging, a case study of the Powell Street on-ramp 
merging area on the eastbound Interstate 80 in California, USA is con-
ducted. As shown in Fig. 8, the study area is about 503 m long with six 
lanes on the main road. The Powell Street on-ramp is connected to the 
main road through an acceleration lane with a length of approximately 
100 m. 
In order to reflect the real-world traffic conditions, we use field- 
collected traffic data to calibrate the input distributions of the merg-
ing conflict model for NVs. Then, we validate the calibrated model by 
comparing the model-estimated CMH values to the empirical CMH 
values derived from data. The data used in the calibration are collected 
under the Next Generation Simulation (NGSIM) program (FHWA, 2016). 
The dataset contains vehicle trajectory data at every 0.1 s collected in 
the study area from 4:00 to 4:15 on April 13, 2015, providing detailed 
information on the NV driving behaviors at merging. The probabilistic 
distributions are fitted with the distribution fitter tool in MATLAB. For 
each model parameter, we fit various types of distribution to the 
observed data and choose the distribution with the maximum 
log-likelihood value. For AVs, the determination of distribution pa-
rameters is relatively difficult due to the lack of empirical data on traffic 
flow including AVs. In this case study, we adopt hypothetical parameter 
values based on the expected capabilities and operating methods of AVs 
Table 2 
Input of the merging conflict model.  
Model input parameter Label Unit 
Normal human-driven Vehicle (NV) Autonomous Vehicle (AV) 
Distribution Parameter Distribution Parameter 
Traffic & Design parameter       
Mainline gap gi  s Burr a = 2.20, c = 4.53, k = 0.67  Burr a = 2.20, c = 4.53, k = 0.67  
On-ramp speed limit vlimit  km/h Point Value 80 Point Value 80 
Driving behavior parameter for the RMV      
Initial speed of the RMV vr  km/h Normal μ = 36.50, σ = 15.58 Point Value 36.5 
Ramp remaining distance Srd  m Generalized Extreme Value μ = 1.78, σ = 1.06, k = 0.89  Uniform 5− 95 
Acceptable gap of the RMV gacc  s Inverse Gaussian μ = 2.78, λ = 13.77  Discrete 1.90 (30 %), 2.95 (40 %), 5.20 (30 %) 
Critical headway for checking 
alternates 
hc  s Point Value 0.88 Point Value 0.88 
Number of alternative gaps checked m  – Point Value 1 Point Value 3 
Maximum acceleration of the RMV amax  m/s2 Point Value 3.4 Point Value 3.4 
Driving behavior parameter for the MFV      
Initial speed of the MFV vm  km/h Lognormal μ = 3.54, σ = 0.23 Point Value 35.5 
Desired headway of the MFV hd  s Generalized Extreme Value μ = 1.21, σ = 0.38, k = -0.11  Discrete 1.10 (30 %), 1.50 (40 %), 2.15 (30 %) 
Mainline awareness time taware  s Uniform 12.1–12.9 – – 
Mainline awareness distance Saware  m – – Point Value 300 
Reaction time of the MFV τ  s Lognormal μ = 0.43, σ = 0.37 Discrete 1.0 (0.99 %), infinite (0.01 %) 
Maximum deceleration of the MFV bmax  m/s2 Point Value 3.4 Point Value 3.4 
* Burr distribution: a – scale, c – first shape, k – second shape. 
* Generalized Extreme Value distribution: μ – location, σ – scale, k – shape. 
* Inverse Gaussian distribution: μ – scale, λ – shape. 
* Lognormal distribution: μ – mean of logarithmic values, σ – standard deviation of logarithmic values. 
* Normal distribution: μ – mean, σ – standard deviation. 
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noted in the published literature and technical reports. The input dis-
tributions used in the case study are summarized in Table 2. 
3.3.1. Parameter calibration 
Here we describe in detail how the parameters of the merging con-
flict model are obtained from the available traffic database and as-
sumptions (please refer to the notation in Table 2 as a summary of model 
parameters). 
3.3.1.1. Mainline gap. The distribution of mainline gap size is fitted to 
the time headway data collected on the road section upstream of the 
merging area in the rightmost lane on the main road (yellow-shaded 
area in Fig. 8). The data with a headway value of 0 or 9999.99 are 
removed (0 represents no preceding vehicle, and 9999.99 indicates that 
the vehicle speed is zero). With a total of 21045 records, a Burr distri-
bution with an expectation of 2.94 s and a variance of 4.14 (95 % 
confidence interval: 1.07 s – 7.45 s) is fitted. As a parameter reflecting 
the traffic conditions, the same distribution of mainline gap size is used 
for NVs and AVs. 
3.3.1.2. Initial speed of the RMV. The distribution of RMV initial speed 
for NVs is fitted to the vehicle speed data collected on the ramp (blue- 
shaded area in Fig. 8). The data with a speed value of 0 are removed. 
With a total of 988 data records, we fit a normal distribution with a 
mean of 36.50 km/h and an approximate range of 6.20 km/h to 67.28 
km/h (95 % confidence level) for NVs. A deterministic value equals the 
mean of NV speed is used as the RMV initial speed for AVs, because it is 
expected that the variation in vehicle speed will be substantially reduced 
by AVs’ capabilities of precise speed control (Krause et al., 2017). 
3.3.1.3. Ramp remaining distance/ ramp cruising distance. The ramp 
cruising distance (Srcd) is defined as the length of the road section be-
tween the DP and the MP, on which the RMV adjust its trajectory to meet 
the chosen target gap. In this case study, we assume that the DP is the 
gore point at which the mainline and the on-ramp connect. As most 
ramp vehicles recorded in the dataset merge at a position very close to 
the end of the acceleration lane, there is no suitable distribution form for 
the ramp cruising distance. Thus, we use the ramp remaining distance 
(Srd) for fitting instead. As shown in Fig. 9, the remaining distance is 
defined as the distance between the MP and the end of the acceleration 
lane, and the sum of the ramp cruising distance and the remaining dis-
tance equals the length of the acceleration lane, which is approximately 
100 m in this study area, namely 
Srcd = 100 − Srd (15) 
With the NGSIM-I80 data, the actual merging points of the ramp 
vehicles are acquired by searching for the positions at which the vehi-
cles’ lane ID information changes from 7 (i.e. the acceleration lane) to 6 
(i.e. the rightmost lane on the main road). With 207 recorded merging 
positions (a record for each merging vehicle) in the data, a generalized 
extreme value distribution with an expectation of 10.87 m and a 95 % 
confidence interval from 0.97 m to 32.01 m is fitted for the remaining 
distance of NVs. For AVs, we assume that the merging may occur at any 
points along the acceleration lane (except for the first and last 5 m for 
safety constraints) at equal chance. Thus, a uniform distribution with a 
range from 5 m to 95 m is assumed for the remaining distance of AVs. 
3.3.1.4. Acceptable gap of the RMV. The acceptable gap is defined as the 
minimum gap that a vehicle can accept for merging. For NVs, this 
parameter is related to the human driver’s personality, experience, 
mental and physical conditions, and many other factors. Thus, it is not 
directly observable in the vehicle trajectory data like NGSIM data. In this 
case study, we approximate the size of acceptable gap using the size of 
the gap that the RMV actually merges into. The actually-merged gap is 
determined as the MFV’s time headway at the last time step before the 
RMV merges. We assume that the acceptable gap is approximately 60 % 
of the actually-merged gap. A varying coefficient may better describe the 
relationship between the actually-merged gap and the acceptable gap, 
however, we use a constant coefficient for simplification. With a coef-
ficient of 0.6, the distribution of the actually-merged gaps observed in 
the simulation is most similar to that derived from the data (p-value of 
two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test = 0.95). In addition, we exclude 
all data with a gap value larger than the 95th percentile of the actually- 
merged gap (12.72 s), as it is reasonable to consider that an RMV decides 
to merge into such a large gap simply because of the existence of the 
large gap instead of the conservativeness of the driver. With a total of 
Fig. 8. Illustration of Powell St. on-ramp merging area (adapted based on FHWA (2016)).  
Fig. 9. Ramp cruising distance and ramp remaining distance.  
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193 data records (data with a gap value of 0 or 9999.99 are also 
removed), an inverse gaussian distribution with an expectation of 2.78 s 
and a 95 % confidence interval from 1.11 s to 5.88 s are determined for 
the RMV acceptable gap of NVs. 
For AVs, the acceptable gap should be a parameter related to the 
driving mode of AVs. As a 30 %–40 % - 30 % share across the aggressive, 
normal, and conservative AV driving modes is assumed, we corre-
spondingly divide the acceptable gaps of human drivers into three 
groups according to the same ratio of 30 %–40 % - 30 % to represent the 
acceptable gaps of the aggressive, normal, and conservative human 
driver groups, respectively. Then, we use the 85th percentile of each 
group (i.e. 1.90 s, 2.95 s, and 5.20 s) as the acceptable gap of AVs in the 
corresponding driving mode. This assumption ensures that most AV 
passengers (85 %) will not feel that the AV behaves too aggressively at 
merging. 
3.3.1.5. Critical headway for checking alternates and number of alternative 
gaps checked. In the merging maneuver process, it is assumed that the 
RMV will check alternative gaps when the risk to merge into the first 
available gap is too high, and only take the risk when no alternative gap 
is found after checking a certain number of gaps. We consider that the 
critical headway is equivalent to a headway that 95 % human drivers are 
unwilling to accept for car-following. Thus, 0.88 s, a value corre-
sponding to the 5th percentile of the MFV desired headway distribution 
(discussed later), is used as the threshold for checking alternative gaps. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the human drivers will only check the 
next immediate gap, while the AVs can check three gaps in the following 
traffic stream thanks to the comprehensive information on traffic con-
ditions provided by the vehicle communication technologies. 
3.3.1.6. Initial speed of the MFV. The distribution of the MFV initial 
speed for NVs is fitted to the vehicle speed data collected on the road 
section upstream of the merging area in the rightmost lane on the main 
road (yellow-shaded area in Fig. 8). Note that two peaks are observed in 
the histogram of mainline vehicle speed data (Fig. 10). This is because 
the data are collected in the build-up period of traffic congestion, and 
data reflecting both congested and non-congested traffic states co-exist 
in the dataset. As it is not possible to describe the congested and non- 
congested traffic flow with a single set of parameters, we remove data 
collected in the congested state, namely data with a speed value less 
than 22 km/h. The speed of 22 km/h is used as the threshold because it is 
the point of the lowest frequency between the two peaks. 
With a total of 19,942 data records, a lognormal distribution with an 
expectation of 35.5 km/h and a 95 % confidence interval of 21.83 km/h 
to 54.62 km/h is fitted for NVs. Similar to the RMV initial speed for AVs, 
a deterministic value equals the expectation of NV speed is used as the 
MFV initial speed for AVs. 
3.3.1.7. Desired headway of the MFV. The MFV desired headway is 
defined as the minimum distance that an MFV tends to keep from the 
RMV merging in front of it. Similar to the RMV acceptable gap, this 
parameter reflects the MFV’s aggressiveness and is not directly 
measurable from the trajectory data. To estimate the desired headway of 
NVs, we randomly selected 300 pairs of leading and following vehicles 
on the road section downstream of the merging area (the green-shaded 
area in Fig. 8) and record their average headway in the process of car- 
following. The selected leading-following vehicle pairs must satisfy 
two conditions: (1) the following relationship should last at least 10 s; 
(2) the following vehicle does not experience stop-and-go during the 
following process. By assuming that the desired headway is approxi-
mately 60 % of the observed car-following headway (the coefficient of 
0.6 gives the best fit of actually-merged gaps with a two-sample Kol-
mogorov–Smirnov test p-value of 0.95), a generalized extreme value 
distribution with an expectation of 1.39 s and a 95 % confidence interval 
from 0.68 s to 2.35 s is fitted for the MFV desired headway for NVs. 
For AVs, the 85th percentiles of the desired headway for the 
aggressive drivers, the normal drivers, and the conservative drivers (i.e. 
1.10 s, 1.50 s, and 2.15 s) are used as the desired headway of AVs in the 
corresponding driving modes. This ensures that the AV behaviors are not 
too aggressive for 85 % of the AV passengers. The possibility of each 
value follows the share of AVs in the corresponding driving mode (30 %– 
40 %-30 %). 
3.3.1.8. Mainline awareness time/distance. Mainline awareness time/ 
distance refers to the range (in second/meter) within which the MFV can 
be aware of the RMV’s merging intention. The vehicle trajectory data do 
not provide information on the awareness time/distance directly. Thus, 
we refer to the pre-maneuver time of speed/path/direction change on 
suburban road or street recommended by AASHTO (2018) for the 
mainline awareness time of NVs. For AVs, a perception range of 300 m 
reported by the leading AV developers (Medford, 2018) is used as the 
mainline awareness distance of AVs. The awareness distance (Saware) is 





Fig. 10. Mainline vehicle speed data derived from the NGSIM I80 dataset.  
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3.3.1.9. Reaction time of the MFV. The reaction time of NVs reflects the 
experience and attention of the human drivers and is widely studied in 
the literature. Since it is impossible to obtain the case-specific reaction 
time from the trajectory data, we refer to the review of AASHTO (2018) 
and set up a lognormal distribution with an expectation of 1.65 s and an 
approximate range of 0.75 s to 3.18 s (95 % confidence level) for human 
drivers’ reaction time. This distribution is in line with findings in the 
literature on brake reaction time (Johansson and Rumar, 1971; Taoka, 
1989). 
It is assumed that AVs need much less time to react compared to NVs 
when the vehicle control systems work properly. However, there could 
be a very minor probability that the AV braking system fails to react due 
to malfunctions or potential cyberattacks (Koopman and Wagner, 2017). 
The reaction time of AVs is infinite in this case. We assume a constant 
reaction time of 1 s for AVs with a 0.01 % possibility of failed reaction 
based on the published literature and AV safety reports (Bhavsar et al., 
2017; Medford, 2018). 
3.3.1.10. Other parameters. As suggested by AASHTO (2018), the ramp 
speed limit is set to 80 km/h. The maximum acceleration of the RMV and 
the maximum deceleration of the MFV are 3.4 m/s2. These correspond to 
the maximum acceleration and deceleration rates observed in the 
merging area in the NGSIM-I80 dataset. 
3.3.2. Comparison of simulation outputs and NSGIM-I80 observations 
While the empirical data from the NGSIM traffic study served to 
calibrate the input distributions of the merging conflict model, the val-
idity of the calibrated model should be explored. This validation could 
be achieved either by comparing the CMH results against the actual road 
crash data, or by simulating other ramp-merge segments as the proxies 
for validation. Due to the limited access to the actual crash data and the 
traffic records which can be used to extract the CMH values, the vali-
dation process in this study is focused on evaluating how the results 
obtained from the proposed merging conflict model compare with the 
actual CMH value observed in the available traffic dataset. 
Fig. 11 compares the Monte-Carlo simulation results of the NV100 
scenario to the NGSIM-I80 data observations in terms of two indicators: 
the size of the actually-merged gap and the CMH value. Fig. 11a shows 
that, with the input distributions in Table 2, the Monte-Carlo process 
successfully reproduces the distribution of the actually-merged gap 
observed in the NGSIM-I80 data (p-value of the two-sample Kolmogor-
ov–Smirnov test = 0.95), suggesting that the proposed model can well 
reflect the actual merging process. The curves of the data and the 
simulation results highly coincident with each other, supporting the 
validity of the fitted probabilistic distributions. 
As shown in Fig. 11b, the simulation results tend to overestimate the 
value of CMH in the area with relatively small CMH (CMH<2 s), 
resulting in a p-value of 0.01 of the two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
test. This is because we assume that the MFV evasive action is fully 
completed when estimating CMH with the merging conflict model, but 
in reality, the evasive action may still be in progress at the time when the 
RMV passes the merging point. Thus, the estimated CMH value might be 
larger than the observed values in the cases where the MFV evasive 
action occurs. The difference is more obvious in the low CMH area 
(CMH<2 s), because the evasive action usually occurs when the head-
way is small, thus it is more frequently present in the cases with lower 
CMH values. Although the simulation results are somewhat optimistic in 
predicting critical merging events, the cumulative distribution produced 
by the simulation has an overall shape and range very similar to the 
distribution derived from the data, especially in the area with larger 
CMH values (for CMH>2 s, the null assumption that the two distribu-
tions are not statistically different is accepted at the 5% significance 
level with a p-value of the two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of 
0.15). This implies that the simulation results are capable of providing 
the reliable insights in the safety performance of the real traffic 
conditions. 
4. Results and discussions 
4.1. Safety performance of AVs 
Fig. 12 shows the cumulative probabilistic distribution of CMH under 
different AV penetration rates. The results of Shapiro-Wilk tests reject 
the normality of the CMH distributions (Table 3a), and the results of the 
two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests show that the distributions 
under different AV penetration rates are statistically different from each 
other (Table 3b). The greater the difference in AV market penetration 
rate, the more significant the difference in the CMH distribution, 
implying that the AVs are expected to have more and more substantial 
influences as their share in the traffic flow increases. 
Based on the probabilistic distributions of the CMH index given in 
Fig. 12, there are several result points that should be discussed which 
represent sudden changes in CMH values. As shown in Fig. 12, the 
scenario with no AV presence in the traffic flow presents a smoothly 
distributed CMH value. However, in the AV-present scenarios, ranging 
from 20 % to 100 % of AVs in the traffic flow, the cumulative proba-
bilities increase suddenly at the CMH values of 1.1 s, 1.5 s, and 2.15 s. 
These values exactly correspond to the defined discrete values of the 
MFV desired headway for AVs (please see Table 2). This finding is 
reasonable, as in most cases where the autonomous MFV takes an 
evasive action, the final distance between the RMV and the MFV (i.e. 
Fig. 11. Comparison of the Monte-Carlo simulation results and the NGSIM-I80 data.  
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CMH) will be expanded to a pre-defined and satisfactory level, namely to 
the size equal to the MFV desired headway. It reflects that the behaviors 
of AVs, with less variation in the driving mode, are expected to be more 
predictable than that of the human-driven NVs. However, this finding 
also reflects to some extent the limitation of this and other existing AV 
road safety studies, as the more reliable references to AV behaviors in 
traffic are still very limited. More testing studies on AV reactions in 
various conflicting situations are required to derive more precise values 
of parameters describing the AV driving behaviors. 
By setting appropriate thresholds, CMH can be used to identify the 
occurrence of critical merging events, such as near-crashes and conflicts. 
In order to define these thresholds, we refer to the critical PET values 
reported in the literature (Tang and Kuwahara, 2011; Paul and Ghosh, 
2019; Qi et al., 2020). The use of reference values from another surro-
gate safety measure is in this case permitted, as CMH and PET represent 
the same idea based on the occupancy of a conflict zone (for PET) or a 
cross-section (for CMH). Note that theoretically, the value of CMH 
should be slightly larger than the value of PET in any individual cases, 
because PET considers a conflict zone with a length, while CMH only 
considers a cross-section where conflicts start (without a length). Thus, 
the value of CMH should be about equal to the value of PET plus the 
travel time in the conflict zone. Therefore, we adopt the upper level of 
the PET thresholds reported in the literature and set the CMH thresholds 
for near-crashes and conflicts to 1 s and 2 s, respectively (black dashed 
lines in Fig. 12). 
Table 4a reports the frequencies and probabilities of near-crashes 
and conflicts under various AV penetration rates. It is obvious that the 
application of AVs substantially reduces the probability of critical 
merging events. Approximately 31 % of near-crashes is avoided when 
the AV penetration rate is as low as 20 %. In the AV100 scenario, the 
Fig. 12. Cumulative distribution of conflicting merging headway (CMH) under incremental AV penetration rates.  
Table 3 
Statistical tests of conflicting merging headway (CMH) distributions under 
different AV penetration rates.  
a) P-value of the Shapiro-Wilk test  
NV100 AV20 AV50 AV80 AV100 
Average p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
b) P-value of the two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test  
NV100 AV20 AV50 AV80 AV100 
NV100 – <0.001 <0.001 0 0 
AV20 – – <0.001 <0.001 0 
AV50 – – – <0.001 <0.001 
AV80 – – – – <0.001 
AV100 – – – – – 
*Due to the limited ability of Shapiro-Wilk test to process large sample size, we 
randomly draw 5000 variables from the 50,000 variables of a study scenario for 
the Shapiro-Wilk test (defined as a trial). For each study scenario, we test five 
such trials of 5000 variables and report the average p-values in Table 3a. 
Table 4 
Safety impact analysis.  
a) Frequency and probability of critical merging events   
NV100 AV20 AV50 AV80 AV100   
Average Frequency (out of 50,000 runs) 
Near- 
crashes 
h ≤ 1 s 737.2 509.2 260.6 76.6 0.2 
Conflicts 1 s < h 
≤2 s 
19259 18024.2 16112.2 14388.4 13124.2 
Total frequency of 
critical events 
19996.2 18533.4 16372.8 14465 13124.4   
Average Probability [%] 
Near- 
crashes 
h ≤ 1 s 1.47 % 1.02 % 0.52 % 0.15 % 0.00 % 
Conflicts 1 s < h 
≤2 s 
38.52 % 36.05 % 32.22 % 28.78 % 26.25 % 
Total probability of 
critical events 
39.99 % 37.07 % 32.75 % 28.93 % 26.25 %  
b) Average evasive braking rate of the mainline following vehicle [m/s2]  
NV100 AV20 AV50 AV80 AV100 
Average evasive braking rate 0.0761 0.0585 0.0365 0.0192 0.0102 
*The average values in this table are estimated from a total of 5 rounds of 
simulation. One round of simulation refers to simulating the merging process for 
50,000 times for each study scenario. Results reported in the other parts of this 
paper (e.g. Fig. 12 and Table 5) are based on the results from the first simulation 
round. 
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probability of near-crashes is reduced to zero, namely almost no acci-
dent is expected to happen with a full AV penetration. In addition, the 
proportion of conflicts also steadily decreases as the AV penetration rate 
increases. Overall, the probability of critical merging events (near- 
crashes and conflicts) is reduced by 13.74 percentage points when 
replacing all NVs with AVs. 
The evasive braking rate of the MFV can reflect the severity of the 
critical merging events. Even though a large CMH is achieved in the end, 
the situation should be considered as severe and undesired if the MFV 
has to brake hard in the evasive action. Table 4b shows the average 
values of the MFV evasive braking rate. The average braking rate goes 
down as the penetration rate of AVs increases, implying that AVs have 
positive effects on smoothing the evasive behaviors in the merge seg-
ments and reducing the severity of the critical events. 
4.2. Cause analysis of near-crashes 
In a total of 1549 near-crashes reported in the first simulation round, 
1385 near-crashes (about 90 %) involve only NVs, 163 of them are be-
tween a NV and an AV, and only 1 near-crash involves only AVs. As at 
least one NV exists in most near-crashes, replacing NVs with AVs can 
substantially reduce the risk of crash. 
Based on the case-by-case analysis of the simulated merging pro-
cesses, all near-crashes involving NVs are caused by the aggressiveness 
of the human drivers, who accept a very small merging gap (as the driver 
of the RMV) or car-following headway (as the driver of the MFV). In the 
results, there is no conflict caused by the late reaction of the human 
driver in the MFV. This is because, given the current assumption on 
mainline awareness time (12.1 s – 12.9 s), the drivers are able to com-
plete the evasive action even if they react late. The only near-crash be-
tween two AVs is caused by the braking failure of the MFV, following the 
RMV’s decision to merge with a risky initial headway. In other cases, the 
AVs are able to maintain a CMH at least equal to the desired headway in 
the aggressive mode (1.1 s), and thus very severe conflicts are avoided. 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis on relevant parameters 
Sensitivity analysis on six model parameters related to AV driving 
behaviors is conducted for the AV100 scenario to provide reference for 
the AV operational design. Other parameters are not included in the 
analysis, because they are either dependent on the traffic conditions (e. 
g. mainline gap size, initial speed, ramp cruising distance) or restricted 
by the vehicle dynamic capabilities and roadway design (e.g. speed 
limit, maximum acceleration and deceleration). Results of the sensitivity 
analysis are shown in Table 5. The table presents the average values of 
the CMH (avg. CMH) and the evasive braking rate (avg. brake) in each 
case. 
The value of CMH is the most sensitive to the acceptable gap of the 
RMV (Pearson correlation = 0.9984). The average value of CMH reduces 
from 3.39 s to 3.01 s when the acceptable gap is reduced by 20 %, and it 
increases to 3.85 s with a 20 % increase in the acceptable gap. Other 
factors that notably influence the average CMH value include the MFV 
desired headway (Pearson correlation = 0.9738), the critical headway 
for checking alternative gaps (Pearson correlation = 0.9955), and the 
number of alternative gaps checked (Pearson correlation = 0.8610). 
The mainline awareness distance and the MFV reaction time are not 
relevant to CMH. This is because, the current parameter values can 
already ensure that the MFV completes the evasive action and maintains 
a desired distance from the RMV in time. Thus, the increase and decrease 
in the parameter values will not notably change the average value of 
CMH. However, the average evasive braking rate is sensitive to the 
change in the mainline awareness distance (Pearson correlation =
-0.8229) and the MFV reaction time (Pearson correlation = 0.9664), as 
the vehicle can brake more gently with a longer awareness distance and 
a faster reaction. 
Table 5b shows the number of near-crashes under various assump-
tions on the AV brake failure rate. A near-crash can be stably observed in 
the simulation when the failure rate rises to 0.04 %, and there are two 
near-crashes with a failure rate higher than 0.09 %. All simulated near- 
crashes between AVs are caused by the MFV’s brake failure in the 
evasive action (i.e. infinite reaction time). This implies that it is very 
important to ensure that the AV brake failure rate is kept within an 
acceptable range. 
5. Limitation and future work 
This study has some limitations. As merging accidents are only oc-
casionally observed in reality, it is difficult to collect comprehensive and 
Table 5 
Sensitivity analysis results.  
a) Sensitivity analysis on conflicting merging headway (CMH) and evasive braking rate   
Smaller value Small value Original value Large value Larger value 
Acceptable gap of the RMV [s] 
value (1.52, 2.36, 4.16) (1.71, 2.66, 4.68) (1.90, 2.95, 5.20) (2.09, 3.25, 5.72) (2.28, 3.54, 6.24) 
avg.CMH 3.0071 3.1935 3.3926 3.5968 3.8455 
avg.brake 0.0103 0.0101 0.0102 0.0100 0.0098 
Desired headway of the MFV [s] 
value (0.88, 1.2, 1.72) (0.99, 1.35, 1.94) (1.10, 1.50, 2.15) (1.21, 1.65, 2.37) (1.32, 1.8, 2.58) 
avg.CMH 3.3348 3.3683 3.3926 3.4218 3.4933 
avg.brake 0.0072 0.0087 0.0102 0.0115 0.0132 
Critical headway for alternates [s] 
value 0.48 0.68 0.88 1.08 1.28 
avg.CMH 3.3371 3.3612 3.3926 3.4321 3.4522 
avg.brake 0.0119 0.0109 0.0102 0.0098 0.0097 
Number of alternative gaps checked 
value 1 2 3 4 5 
avg.CMH 3.3481 3.3785 3.3926 3.4090 3.3961 
avg.brake 0.0120 0.0106 0.0102 0.0099 0.0098 
Mainline awareness distance [m] 
value 100 200 300 400 500 
avg.CMH 3.4006 3.3789 3.3926 3.4014 3.3874 
avg.brake 0.0957 0.0234 0.0102 0.0057 0.0037 
Reaction time of the MFV [s] 
value 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 
avg.CMH 3.3837 3.3817 3.3926 3.4183 3.3860 
avg.brake 0.0099 0.0100 0.0102 0.0102 0.0106  
b) Number of near-crashes and the reaction failure rate of AVs 
Failed reaction rate [%] 0.10 % 0.09 % 0.08 % 0.07 % 0.06 % 0.05 % 
Number of near-crashes 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Failed reaction rate [%] 0.04 % 0.03 % 0.02 % 0.01 % 0.005 % 0.001 % 
Number of near-crashes 1 0 0 0 0 0  
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accurate data of actual merging accidents without long-term observa-
tion or the help of local traffic authorities. Due to our limited access to 
the empirical accident data, the efficiency of the proposed CMH index is 
only discussed from a theoretical perspective in this paper, while a more 
comprehensive data-driven validation is a part of the future research 
plan. In the future, it is recommended to check the correlation between 
the number of merging conflicts estimated by the CMH index and the 
actual number of accidents observed in the field, when proper empirical 
data are available. A possible comparison procedure is suggested in 
Fig. 13. The CMH index can be derived from vehicle trajectories 
collected from field investigations or well-calibrated simulation studies, 
and the correlation shall be tested quantitatively under various cir-
cumstances (e.g., at different sites or times of day). Further, the per-
formance of the CMH index shall be benchmarked against the prevailing 
safety surrogate measures, such as TTC and PET, to assess the superiority 
of CMH in reflecting ramp merging safety. This can be done by 
comparing the correlations between the number of field-observed 
merging accidents and the number of merging conflicts estimated by 
different safety indexes. 
In addition, assumptions and policy recommendations are widely 
used for the description and modeling of AVs in this paper, due to the 
absence of real data on the AV behaviors. This may introduce certain 
bias into the results. This deficiency should be covered in the future as 
more and more results of AV road test become available. In this regard, 
the AV parameters used in the case study should only be considered as a 
baseline for the application of the methodology, and it is encouraged to 
calibrate the AV parameters in a similar way to the calibration of the NV 
parameters, when proper AV data are available. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a method to capture and assess the risk of critical 
events at freeway on-ramp merging with a consideration of AV presence 
in the traffic flow. A new conflict index that is primarily designed for the 
lateral merging conflicts, called Conflict Merging Headway (CMH), is 
proposed in theory, and a merging conflict model is developed to esti-
mate the value of CMH by considering the interactions between an RMV 
and an MFV in various situations. Real-world uncertainties and varia-
tions are included in the safety investigation by using data-driven 
probabilistic distributions as model inputs, and Monte-Carlo simula-
tions are conducted to estimate the probability of critical merging events 
under various AV penetration rates. The developed safety investigation 
approach, incorporating merging-specific traffic conflict techniques and 
probabilistic risk assessment, is the first contribution of this paper. This 
approach can be transferred to investigate traffic safety in other lane- 
changing cases, such as overtaking, merging into a platoon, and merg-
ing at lane reduction. 
According to the case study results, the introduction of AVs will have 
a positive effect on the overall safety performance of the traffic flow. It is 
found that most near-crashes at on-ramp merging are caused by the high 
aggressiveness of the human drivers, which can be substantially elimi-
nated by the introduction of AVs. With the presence of AVs, the prob-
ability of critical merging events is remarkably reduced, even at a 
relatively low penetration rate; and the reduction in the merging risk 
becomes more remarkable as the AV penetration rate increases. In 
addition, the average evasive braking rate of the MFV turns lower with a 
larger AV share in the traffic flow, indicating a reduction in conflict 
severity and an improvement in passenger comfort. The revelation of the 
potential safety impacts of AVs is the second contribution of this paper. 
Sensitivity analysis on the essential parameters related to AV driving 
behaviors shows that the acceptable gap of the RMV is a major 
contributing factor in the crash/conflict outcome. Other factors, such as 
the MFV desired headway, the critical gap for checking alternative gaps, 
and the number of alternative gaps checked, can also affect the safety 
performance of AVs to varying degrees. Therefore, when designing the 
operational behaviors of AVs, it is important to determine appropriate 
values for these influential parameters by jointly considering opera-
tional efficiency and safety. Moreover, it is found in the sensitivity 
analysis that the number of near-crashes between AVs is closely related 
to the braking failure rate of the MFV, indicating that the proper func-
tioning of the autonomous driving systems must be sufficiently ensured. 
The potential to provide implications on the future development of AVs 
is another contribution of this study. 
The current study has some limitations. The superiority of the pro-
posed CMH index stays at the theoretical level in this paper. In the 
future, the efficiency of CMH should be further investigated and 
benchmarked with the prevailing safety surrogate measures, preferably 
with empirical data on actual merging accidents observed in the field. 
Further, due to the absence of empirical data on AV driving behaviors, 
the setting of AV parameters primarily employs assumptions and policy 
recommendations. As a result, these parameter values should only act as 
a reference for the application of the methodology and be subject to 
adaptions when being applied in other study cases (e.g. different loca-
tions/ time periods), as the conditions of traffic operation and data 
availability may vary from case to case. 
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